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HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Prior to the 1982 amendments of section 10(a) of the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), parties not needing any federal permit lacked
access to certain regulatory mechanisms of the Act. The revised
law provides those parties with the option of preparing a Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP), the approval of which by the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) frees the planners from the Act's prohibi-
tions against the taking of endangered species. This Comment ex-
amines the statutory requirements for the drafting and approval
of HCPs. In examining the flaws of the first three HCPs developed
under the new law, this Comment suggests modifications to har-
monize section 10(a) with the remainder of the ESA.
INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)1 was enacted by
Congress in response to its findings that extinctions are a result of
"economic growth and development untempered by adequate con-
cern and conservation," that additional species are in danger of or
threatened with extinction, and that these species are of "esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value
to the Nation and its people."' 2 By enacting the ESA, Congress
sought to effectuate the goal of "better safeguarding, for the benefit
of all citizens, the Nation's heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants;" the
ESA also fulfilled international obligations contained in numerous
treaties.3
The purposes of the ESA extend beyond conservation of individual
species;4 conservation of the ecosystems upon which the endangered
and threatened species5 depend also is stressed. 6 To achieve these
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1541 (1982)).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (1982). The Endangered Species Act has been described
as the "first federal statute to embody a truly comprehensive federal effort at wildlife
preservation." M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLiFE LAW 319 (rev. ed.
1983).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); see also id. § 1531(a)(4)(G).
4. Species is defined to include subspecies and, for vertebrates only, distinct
populations. Id. § 1532(16).
5. "Endangered species" is defined to mean any species which is in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range. Id. § 1532(6); see also 50
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goals and protect flora and fauna, Congress provided a series of pro-
cedures, the principal components of which include regulations to de-
termine which species need the protection of endangered or
threatened status; guidelines to establish whether any habitat should
be designated as "critical;"'7 procedures to facilitate cooperation
among federal agencies and between federal and state governments; 8
and tools to enforce prohibited acts.9
At the heart of the ESA lies the mandate that federal agencies"shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species."'1
The Act defines "conserve" to mean all necessary methods shall be
used to bring a species to the point at which the protection of the
Act is no longer needed."' Declines in populations must not simply
be halted, they must be reversed; 12 the status quo will not suffice.
Section 913 prohibits the "take"'14 of any endangered species of fish
or wildlife and the removal and reduction to possession of any en-
dangered species of plant. The meaning of "take" encompasses
"harm" and "harass," thereby precluding significant alteration of
C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12 (1985) (complete listing of the species). A "threatened species" isone which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(20).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); see also Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & NaturalResources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), afid, 639 F.2d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 1981)(state maintained herds of feral animals which were destroying habitat resulted in a
taking).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1982).
.8. Id. §§ 1535-1536.
9. Id. § 1538.
10. Id. § 1531(c).
11. Id. § 1532(3); see also Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. UnitedStates Evnt'l Protection Agency, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (1st Cir. 1982) (review of admin-istrative decision that site of oil refinery would not jeopardize endangered species, dis-
cussing use of necessary methods for conservation).
12. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1982).
14. "Take" is defined at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1982) to include "harass, harm,pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in anysuch conduct." "Harass" is defined in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1985) to mean "an intentionalor negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoyingit to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include,but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering." "Harm" is defined in 50 C.F.R. §17.3 (1985) to mean "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may in-clude significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injureswildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feed-
ing or sheltering."
The prohibitions of section 9 apply to endangered species. The ESA states that appro-priate regulations are to be issued for threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1982). Inpractice, almost all threatened species receive the protection of section 9. 50 C.F.R. §17.31 (1985). A few predators are covered by special provisions. See Goldman-Carter,Federal Conservation of Threatened Species: By Administrative Discretion or by Legis-lative Standard?, 11 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 63 (1983) (discussing matters affectinganimals). Plants, which generally receive less attention in ESA matters, are covered by adifferent definition of take. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (1982).
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habitat and disruption of normal behavioral patterns such as breed-
ing and feeding. The breadth of the definition provides the means to
protect endangered species not only from direct dangers such as
hunting, but also from the indirect and perhaps more pernicious dan-
gers of environmental degradation.
15
By giving endangered species the highest of priorities,'
6 Congress
considerably strengthened earlier legislation.
17 But the new legisla-
tion did not stop activities leading to extinctions. Conflict between
the ESA and "progress" was inevitable, and dramatically came to
the fore in the case of the snail darter and Tellico Dam.
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,"
8 the Supreme Court found
that the plain language of the ESA required halting the completion
of a 100 million dollar dam to save the snail darter, a plain, three-
inch long fish. The ESA requires institutionalized caution as a re-
sponse to the potential loss of any species.
19
15. For an excellent discussion of the concept of take, see Field, The Evolution of
the Wildlife Taking Concept From its Beginning to its Culmination in the Endangered
Species Act, 21 Hous. L. REV. 457 (1984).
16. Hill, 437 U.S. at 174.
17. The Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, § l(b), 80 Stat.
926 (repealed by the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat.
903), had made the preservation of endangered species an issue of national importance,
but directed federal agencies to protect these species only "insofar as is practicable and
consistent with their primary purposes." The 1966 Act provided limited prohibitions
against taking, applying only to federal lands. Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 4(c), 80 Stat. 927-
28. Passage of the Endangered Species Conservation Act three years later did no more
than add some strength in the form of prohibitions against the import, transportation,
and sale of illegally taken species. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed by
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 903).
Hearings leading to the passage of the ESA show an awareness that impending losses
of species were greater than realized and that past legislation was inadequate to stem the
accelerating tide of extinction of approximately one species a year. H.R. REP. No. 412,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2989. Humanity's culpability was evidenced by testimony indicating that half of the re-
corded extinctions of mammmals over the past 2000 years occurred in the last 50 years.
Hill, 437 U.S. at 176 (citing Hearings on Endangered Species before the Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 202
(1973)). See generally M. BEAN, supra note 2, at 319-24.
18. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
19. The importance of any species is clear from the facts of Hill: the snail darter
is one of almost 100 species of darters, 45 of which inhabit the rivers of Tennessee, the
site of Tellico Dam. Id. at 159 n.7. The situation was made more paradoxical by contin-
ued appropriations from a Congress acutely aware of the discovery of the snail darter. Id.
at 172.
Although the snail darter seems insignificant in terms of conventional values, the ESA
was enacted with concern for the "incalculable" value of the genetic heritage of every
species. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 178. The ESA is looked upon with disfavor when species
such as the snail darter or furbish louswort stop large water projects. See generally Kel-
lert, Social and Perceptual Factors in the Preservation of Animal Species, in THE PRas-
In 1978 Congress responded to the Supreme Court decision by
amending the Act.2" Although section 721 was modified to provide an
exemption process for projects deemed to be of overwhelming impor-
tance,22 the strength of Hill remains to be applied to an endangered
species act not eviscerated by Congress in the 1978 or subsequent
amendments.23
In its current form, section 7 provides a method of ensuring that
government actions do not work to the detriment of endangered
wildlife. Section 7(a)(2) requires that a federal agency consult with
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to ensure that, based upon the
best available scientific and commercial data, the agency's actions
are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endan-
gered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat.24 Such consultation with the FWS istriggered if a project involves a federal agency. The project may be
an entirely governmental affair, such as expanding facilities on a
military base or building a highway, or it may involve a private
party needing a government permit.
ERVATION OF SPECIES 50 (B. Norton ed. 1986).
20. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat.
3751.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982).
22. Even then, Tellico Dam did not pass the exemption process. Ultimately, spe-cial legislation allowed the dam to be completed and the flood gates of the reservoir wereclosed. Today the snail darter is alive and well in one river where it was transplantedsuccessfully, as well as in a half dozen other rivers where it later was discovered to occurnaturally. See V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES § 13.21 n.52 (Supp. 1985).
23. See, e.g., Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights,20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 9 (1985); Coggins & Russell, Beyond Shooting SnailDarters in Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEo. L.J.
1433, 1477 n.395 (1982).
24. Briefly, the consultation process calls for the action agency to inquire of theFWS whether a species covered by the ESA is present in the area of the project. If so, abiological assessment must be prepared; if not, the consultation process is completed.During consultation the action agency must not make any irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources. If, after consultation, the FWS determines that no jeopardywill occur, or that there will be jeopardy but reasonable and prudent alternatives exist,then the FWS will provide a report to that effect, including any reasonable and prudentmeasures to minimize the impact. A take approved by the consultation process is thenclassified as incidental, and cleared from the prohibitions against any taking.An exemption from the "no jeopardy" provisions of 7(a)(2) may be granted by theEndangered Species Committee when the studies, reports, and hearings required by thatsection show that a balancing test favors the exemption. Included as factors are the ab-sence of reasonable and prudent alternatives, benefits of the agency action clearly out-weighing courses of action consistent with conserving the species or habitat, and regionalor national significance for the agency action. An exemption also will include mitigationand enhancement to minimize the adverse effects of the exempted agency action. Theexemption process rarely has been used. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982); 50C.F.R. § 450 (1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402); M.
BEAN, supra note 2, at 355-75.
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Prior to the 1982 amendments, 25 a private party not requiring a
federal permit was not entitled to a consultation with the FWS.26
Section 10(a) now "addresses the concerns of private landowners
who are faced with having otherwise lawful actions not requiring
Federal permits [that is, those not eligible for section 7 consulta-
tions] prevented by section 9 prohibitions against taking. 21
As a result of amended section 10(a), 28 more parties have sought
statutory permission to take endangered species. Although fairness
to parties seeking permits may have been the impetus for the amend-
ments, the vital question of whether endangered species will benefit
from these amendments remains. The purpose of this Comment is to
explain and evaluate section 10(a) of the ESA in relation to its legis-
lative history and its goal of conservation, illustrating the process
with examples from the early uses of amended section 10(a).
BACKGROUND TO SECTION 10(a)
Sections 7 and 10 are closely related and quite similar in terms of
substantive requirements. Section 10(a) resembles a reorganized sec-
tion 7.21 Requesting a section 10 permit requires a consultation
25. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat.
1411.
26. The private party thereby was faced with the uncertainty of commencing a
project in the face of stringent prohibitions against taking contained in section 9. The
party received neither the blessing of the FWS from a consultation, nor did the possibil-
ity of obtaining an exemption exist. Use of the procedures of the ESA for problem reso-
lution depended upon whether a party needed a federal permit, a criterion unrelated to
biology. The "accident" of needing any federal permit was not a consistent way to en-
force the ESA.
Section 7 also contained an inconsistency. A project approved in consultation but re-
sulting in a taking was not free from section 9 prohibitions against taking. See generally
Goldman-Carter, supra note 14; Field, supra note 15. Although problems had not yet
arisen because of this inconsistency, the potential for problems existed. To achieve inter-
nal consistency a party in compliance with one portion of the Act should be free from the
uncertainty of enforcement of a different portion. The potential problem was not simply
the prospect of one branch of the FWS pursuing another branch. Rather, 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g) (1982) authorizes civil suits, and a citizen could have used section 9 to enjoin a
project approved by the FWS under section 7. To solve this problem, section 7 now
classifies takings resulting from a project approved in consultation as "incidental."
27. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2870 [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1982).
29. The provisions are aligned as follows:
under section 7.3o This is not a major obstacle to obtaining a permit
because section 10(a) contains so many section 7 requirements, it is
difficult to imagine a plan fulfilling section 10 but not fulfilling sec-
tion 7.
The legislative history of the ESA indicates that sections 7 and 10
are to be treated similarly.31 Two points emerge from the delibera-
tions of Congress. First, the great similarity in substantive standards
between section 7 and section 10 is intentional. Second, while the
Basic Requirement Section 7 Section 10
specify the taking's impact (b)(4)(B)(i) (a)(2)(A)(i)
use of steps to minimize impact (b)(4)(B)(ii) (a)(2)(A)(ii)
alternative actions considered (h)(1)(A)(i) (a)(2)(A)(iii)
the taking will be incidental (b)(4)(B) (a)(2)(B)(i)
there must be no jeopardy (a)(2) (a)(2)(B)(iv)
As explained at infra note 30, the language of section 10(a)(2)(B)(iv) is the regulatory
definition of jeopardy.
30. Congress used that regulatory language under the belief that the use "of the
regulatory language adopted by the Secretary of the Interior to implement section
7(a)(2) rather than the language of the provision itself eliminates the implication that
other permits issued under section 10 do not require consultation and biological opinions
issued pursuant to section 7." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 30, reprinted in
1982 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2871. The FWS concluded that a consul-
tation was required because a 10(a) permit was an action authorized by the government.
50 Fed. Reg. 39,683 (1985). The g two completed HCPs have gone through the consulta-
tion process, although this process almost always will be a formality.
31. The House Report provided the following account:
Another concern raised by industry was that of resolving conflicts between Sec-
tion 7 and Section 9. After complying with the rigorous demands of the Section
7 consultation process, the applicant or Federal agency receives no assurance
that any incidental and unintentional takings contemplated under a Section 7
consultation will not be prosecuted under Section 9 which prohibits any taking.
There are also situations where the unintentional taking may occur on private
lands owned by a developer who has no need of a Federal permit. These indi-
viduals have no access to the consultation and exemption provisions of the Act
since they do not apply for any Federal permit or license to conduct their activ-
ities but, nevertheless, they are subject to the taking prohibitions of Section 9.
In order to meet these two different concerns, the Committee tailored two simi-
lar provisions. For the applicant who consults with the Secretary under the
Section 7 process, the Secretary shall provide him with a written statement on
what permissible incidental taking may occur. For private land owners, the
Committee designed a solution through the permit provisions of Section 10 by
authorizing the Secretary to issue permits to individuals who demonstrate that
the taking of an endangered species will be incidental to, but not the purpose
of, the lawful activity they will perform.
H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2807, 2815 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. The Report also stated:
"The secretary would base his determination on whether or not to grant the [10(a)]
permit under the same standard as found in Section 7(a)(2) of the Act, that is, whether
or not the taking would jeopardize the continued existence of the species." Id. at 31,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2807, 2831. Furthermore, the
House Conference indicated: "This provision addresses the concerns of private landown-
ers who are faced with having otherwise Jawful actions not requiring Federal permits
prevented by section 9 prohibitions against taking." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
27, at 29, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2860, 2870.
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standards are very similar, each section is intended for a particular
type of applicant and is not interchangeable.
32
Two Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) have been completed
under amended section 10, one is nearing completion, and more are
being considered.33 The following summary is an introduction to the
three HCPs discussed in the remainder of the Comment.
San Bruno Mountain HCP31
San Bruno Mountain is located south of San Francisco, Califor-
nia. Development was slated for the largely privately held area when
an endangered butterfly, the Mission Blue, was discovered in the
area; other species proposed as endangered also inhabit the site.
3 5
A committee of three city governments, one county government,
the private landowners, the FWS, the State of California, and a con-
servation group, created the HCP. Congress liked what it knew of
the plan,386 and touted it as a model for 10(a) permits.37 Upon the
32. While the legislative history reflects no substantive differences between sec-
tions 7 and 10(a), congressional commentary suggests that procedural differences might
distinguish the two. Congress amended section 10 to "give the Secretary more flexibility
in regulating the incidental taking of endangered and threatened species." CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 27, at 29, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2860, 2870. In expressing its approval of the first HCP, Congress directed that to "the
maximum extent possible, the Secretary should utilize this authority under this provision
to encourage creative partnerships between the public and private sectors and among
governmental agencies in the interest of species and habitat conservation." Id. at 30,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2871.
33. For example, a Least Bell's Vireo Comprehensive Species Management Plan
Task Force chaired by the San Diego Association of Governments is planning a series of
HCPs. See Final Draft Guidelines for the Preparation of a Habitat Conservation Plan
for the Least Bell's Vireo (October 1986) (available at San Diego Association of Govern-
ments, San Diego, California); Least Bell's Vireo Comprehensive Species Management
Plan Meeting No. 8 (November 18, 1986) (minutes available at San Diego Association
of Governments, San Diego, California).
34. San Bruno Mountain Habitat Conservation Plan Steering Committee, San
Bruno Mountain Area Habitat Conservation Plan (1982) (available at San Mateo
County Planning Division, Redwood City, California) [hereinafter San Bruno HCP]. For
related federal documents, see 48 Fed. Reg. 3663 (1983) and 48 Fed. Reg. 10,136
(1983).
35. San Bruno HCP, supra note 34, at S-1 to -10.
36. Starting with the initial introduction of the ESA, Congress rarely has ex-
amined possible complications. See Coggins & Russell, supra note 23, at 1437, 1451.
The legislative history does not reflect any careful analysis of the HCP process. The San
Bruno plan is described at length, but Congress did not provide any comments about how
situations differing from San Bruno should be handled. For instance, the San Bruno
HCP involved one developer and one piece of property; the Conference Report provides
no insight on the preparation of HCPs when those variables have changed.
37. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2871.
enactment of section 10(a), the entities involved applied for and re-
ceived a 10(a) permit.3 8 A court challenge questioned the biological
methodology underlying the HCP, but the challenge proved
unsuccessful.3 9
The plan provided for development destroying fourteen percent of
the habitat of the Mission Blue. About one-quarter of this amount
may be reclaimed after construction is completed. The habitat de-
struction will cause an estimated two percent to five percent increase
in the likelihood of Mission Blue extinction.40 In exchange for the
permit to develop certain areas, a substantial area of privately owned
habitat was to be conveyed to the County of San Mateo. Funding
provided by developers would allow the local authorities to stop the
invasion of the butterfly's habitat by exotic vegetation and prevent
incursions by off-road vehicles. These mitigation efforts were be-
lieved to enhance the Mission Blue's chances of survival as compared
to the alternative of "no action" - no development and no
mitigation.41
The Coachella Valley HCP 2
The Coachella Valley Fringe-toed Lizard is a reptile adapted to
"blowsand" 43 found in the desert near Palm Springs, California.
This threatened species is a representative of a highly specialized
community which exists in the dunes of this region. The lizard is
already absent from nearly one-half of its former range."
38. 48 Fed. Reg. 10,136 (1983) (issuance of permit for incidental take).
39. See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir.
1985). The plaintiff questioned the study methods used by the researchers. An attack on
this basis will be difficult because the FWS decision will be reviewed under the provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982), which invokes an"arbitrary and capricious" standard. See Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685
F.2d 678, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court was particularly uninterested because the
claims of inappropriate methodology had hardly been raised during the administrative
hearings. The case suggests that if the outcome of an HCP appears to be heading in an
unsatisfactory direction, one should pursue the disagreement fully at the administrative
level, particularly if the questions are more of a biological or factual nature. The case
also suggests that pursuing any of the more legal or interpretive issues is more likely to
be successful on review. See also Note, Where Have All the Butterflies Gone? Ninth
Circuit Allows Incidental Taking, 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 93 (1986).
40. San Bruno HCP, supra note 34, at S-I to -10.
41. Id.
42. Coachella Valley Fringe-toed Lizard Habitat Conservation Plan Steering
Committee, Coachella Valley Fringe-toed Lizard Habitat Conservation Plan (1985)
(available at Riverside County Planning Department, Riverside, California) [hereinafter
Coachella Valley HCP]. For related federal documents, see 51 Fed. Reg. 4540 (1986).
43. "Blowsand" refers to sand which has been separated by wind from alluvial
(water-borne) deposits. Dunes formed from blowsand require constant replenishment. To
preserve the dunes, a conservation plan must consider the protection of source areas of
sand, and ensure that nothing will block the transport of the sand. Coachella Valley
HCP, supra note 42, at S-2 to -3.
44. Id. at S-1 to -7.
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Nine cities and one county applied for 10(a) permits. Their HCP
will preserve eleven percent of the remaining occupiable habitat as of
1984, or roughly one-quarter of the habitat capable of sustaining
blowsand a half century from now.4 5 The plan provides for funding
from developers to pay for part of the acquisition costs of the pre-
serves. Remaining funds will come from various branches of govern-
ment and from private conservation organizations.
4 6
North Key Largo HCP'
7
The tropical hardwood hammock plant community is one of the
most restricted and vulnerable habitats in the United States.
4 8 The
hammocks on this Florida key are the home of three endangered spe-
cies - one swallowtail butterfly and two mammals. Adjacent wet-
lands provide habitat for the endangered American Crocodile.
Local developers are currently preparing an HCP. An Environ-
mental Impact Statement is being prepared to accompany the re-
quested section 10(a) permit.4 9 The final plan is expected to propose
clustered developments while providing funds for mitigation in the
form of restrictions on aerial spraying of pesticides, removal of exotic
vegetation, and control of introduced mammals. The plan proposes
substantial governmental financing of habitat acquisition.
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HCP
Statutory Standards of the HCP
The Secretary"0 may issue the permit authorizing the takings re-
quested in the HCP after review and public comment if:
(i) the taking will be incidental;
(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and
mitigate the impacts of such taking;
(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. North Key Largo Habitat Conservation Plan Study Committee, North Key
Largo, Florida Habitat Conservation Plan (Draft of June 12, 1986) (available at Plan-
ning Department, Monroe County, Florida) [hereinafter North Key Largo HCP].
48. 49 Fed. Reg. 34,502 (1984) (commentary accompanying final rule).
49. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,299 (1985) (notice of intent to prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement).
50. "Secretary" means the Secretary in charge of the particular species. Jurisdic-
tion over endangered and threatened species is divided: marine mammals are under the
Secretary of Commerce, plants are under the Secretary of Agriculture (in conjunction
with the Smithsonian Institution), and the rest are under the Secretary of the Interior.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15), 1541 (1982).
provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and
recovery of the species in the wild; and
(v) [any other measures required by the Secretary are met]. 1
Cautionary language also allows the Secretary to request assurances
and impose other conditions, such as reporting requirements. 2
Incidental Taking
Congress provided the following definition of incidental: "[b]y use
of the word "incidental" the Committee intends to cover situations
in which it is known that taking will occur if the other activity is
engaged in but such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of,
the activity. ' '5 The FWS undoubtedly borrowed from this definition
in its initial regulations: "any taking otherwise prohibited, if such
taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity.""
"Incidental take permit" and the HCP have come to serve as a
label for the entire process.5 5 In conventional usage, incidental has
meanings related to intent and purpose, with the connotation of be-
ing nonessential or minor in character. Because the natural conclu-
sion is that incidental refers to the degree or amount of taking, un-
certainty pervades the literature on this subject; the meaning of
incidental and how or whether it relates to the jeopardy standard, is
unclear.58 The use of the word "incidental" tends to trivialize a seri-
ous subject, the taking of endangered species.
Revised regulations published in June 1986 offer a new definition:
incidental take "refers to takings that result from, but are not the
purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity conducted by
the Federal agency or applicant." 57
Having established that "incidental" refers to the purpose and not
the degree of the take, the question remains whether the standard
should be included, at least so prominently, in the statute. If its in-
clusion is intended to advise poachers and smugglers not to apply for
permits, then the advice is misdirected because it addresses those
who would not apply for permits and those whose applications would
not be accepted. Given the history of confusing meanings and the
51. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
52. Id.
53. HousE REPORT, supra note 31, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMiN. NEWS 2807, 2831.
54. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1985).
55. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926-27 (1986) (commentary accompanying final rules to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402).
56. For a discussion of jeopardy, see infra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
57. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,958 (1986) (commentary accompanying final rules to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402).
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appearance of being a substantive rather than normative standard,
the label of "incidental take" should be set aside.
The Taking Will Not Appreciably Reduce the Likelihood of
Survival and Recovery
Section 10(a)(2)(B)(iv) requires that, in order for the Secretary to
approve an HCP, the taking incorporated in the plan must not "ap-
preciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild." The language of this standard consists of the
regulatory definition of the "jeopardize the continued existence"
standard of section 7(a)(2). Congress apparently used the regulatory
language instead of the statutory jeopardy terminology to indicate
procedural differences between 10(a) and the rest of section 10.58
While the reasoning for this choice may eventually prove poor, the
Congressional intent in having the "ultimate barrier" 59 of the jeop-
ardy standard apply in both sections is clear.8 0
No more important concept exists in sections 7 and 10 than that
of "jeopardy." Current regulations describe "jeopardize the contin-
ued existence" as meaning "to engage in an action that reasonably
would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the
wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that
species.""1 This 1986 definition modified a previous one by inserting
"both" before survival and recovery.
The FWS maintains that this much protested change82 does not
represent any change in internal policy.63 However, this emphasis
may reduce the number of jeopardy opinions. If an action affects
survival, recovery obviously is affected. But biologists might feel that
extinction will not be appreciably more likely if a reduction in num-
bers occurs, while the same reduction clearly would sidetrack recov-
ery. If a distinction can be made between what affects recovery and
what affects survival, and an appreciable reduction in the likelihood
58. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 29, reprinted in 1982 US. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2870.
59. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,931 (1986) (commentary accompanying final rules to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402). A finding of jeopardy will require either the modification of
the project or the rigorous exemption process, thus the label "ultimate barrier" is
appropriate.
60. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
61. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402).
62. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,933 (1986) (commentary accompanying final rules to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402).
63. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,934 (1986).
of both is required to find jeopardy, then the jeopardy standard has
been notably relaxed.
This distinction must be minor, if it exists at all. A species is des-
ignated as endangered or threatened only if its numbers are already
so small as to be highly vulnerable to extinction without added pres-
sure.64 It is difficult to visualize a taking which would appreciably
reduce the likelihood of recovery and not also increase the vulnera-
bility of the species sufficiently to reduce the likelihood of survival.
Even the FWS concedes that "these concepts are generally consid-
ered together in analyzing effects, and it is difficult to draw clear cut
distinctions. '6
5
Emphasizing survival over recovery runs counter to the ESA's
purposes of conservation and of bringing about recovery. As the Su-
preme Court noted in Hill, the "plain intent of Congress in enacting
this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinc-
tion, whatever the cost."'66 By halting the trend toward extinction,
survival is maintained; reversal of the trend requires efforts toward
recovery. It seems clear that Congress did not intend the FWS to
approve actions which jeopardize recovery. This affirmative duty to
bring about recovery has also been strongly enforced by the federal
courts. In evaluating hunting regulations, one court noted that the
FWS has "an affirmative duty to increase the population of pro-
tected species.
'6 7
The jeopardy standard must next be considered in the context of
section 10(a). The Secretary does not have the power to direct
outside parties to take affirmative steps to conserve species.68 How-
64. See generally R. MACARTHUR & E. WILSON, THE THEORY OF ISLAND Bio-
GEOGRAPHY (1967).
65. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,934 (1986) (commentary accompanying final rules to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402).
66. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added). This mandate still applies after the
1978 and 1982 amendments. See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 261 (9th Cir. 1984); Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 789
(D. Minn. 1984).
67. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977); ac-
cord Connor v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
68. The Secretary has limited power even within the federal government. Section
7(a)(1) states that "other Federal agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assis-
tance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act
by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species." 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(1) (1982). The FWS correctly notes that it does not have the authority to tell
other agencies how to conserve under section 7(a)(1). 51 Fed. Reg. 19,934 (1986) (com-
mentary accompanying final rules to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402). For judicial agree-
ment with the Secretary's position, see North Slope Borough v. Watt, 20 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1457, 1461 (D. Alaska 1984); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d
359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976).
While the Secretary may not have veto power over other agencies, those agencies have
been commanded to utilize their authorities in furtherance of conservation, and the Sec-
retary must tell them how to do so. If sections 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2) are to be applied
together, the concepts of jeopardy and conservation must be in alignment.
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ever, the jeopardy standard contained in section 7 is one of the crite-
ria for granting section 10(a) permits. The standard requires that
the permit not allow actions appreciably reducing the likelihood of
recovery or survival.
In authorizing destruction of fourteen percent of the Mission
Blue's habitat, the San Bruno permit authorized a substantial tak-
ing. Although the biological premises underlying the plan have been
questioned, 9 the conclusion that only a minimal increase in chances
of extinction would result was essential to the plan's success. In both
the HCP and the court challenge, mitigation was an important fac-
tor. Mitigation offered an overall enhancement of conditions over the
projected long-term status quo.7 0 The prospects for survival were
greater with implementation of the San Bruno HCP than with
maintainence of the status quo.
The Coachella Valley HCP can only be described as doing, under
the guise of an "incidental take," great violence to the concepts of
recovery and survival. Taking a threatened species, with a range al-
ready reduced by one-half, and permitting it to be reduced to less
than one-quarter of its remaining range, make its reclassification as
endangered certain. Even if the biological evaluation is correct and
adequate preserves will remain to prevent extinction, the Fringe-toed
Lizard probably will warrant reclassification as an endangered spe-
cies in the near future."1
The first draft of the North Key Largo HCP could not be assessed
in similar fashion because the plan presented insufficient biological
information.7 2 Areas were designated for development despite the
absence of information about the effect that those developments
69. See supra note 39.
70. The remaining habitat was being invaded by nonnative species of plants.
While this had been set in motion by man's activities, the alteration was now occurring
"naturally". Off-road vehicles were also causing problems. Without affirmative action,
both problems only would have become worse. San Bruno HCP, supra note 34, at S-1.
For a discussion of the "no action" alternative and the status quo as a comparative stan-
dard, see infra text accompanying notes 130-31.
71. Although it is not a binding policy statement, the FWS asked for public com-
ment on the question of whether the Coachella Valley Fringe-toed Lizard should be re-
moved from the federal list of threatened and endangered species if preserves are estab-
lished. 49 Fed. Reg. 39,620 (1984) (notice of intent). When the development permitted
by the Coachella Valley HCP is finished, the minimal remaining habitat will require the
maximum protection of the ESA. The ongoing protection of "endangered" would be
needed to aid enforcement in connection with the preserves (the section 9 prohibitions),
and to provide immediate protection for any populations discovered outside the areas
covered by the permit.
72. North Key Largo HCP, supra note 47, at III-1 (undated first draft). The
approximate number of individuals to be taken was not even known.
would have on endangered species. The second draft presents scant
information7 s from several recently completed studies; remarkably,
the land use patterns of the first draft remained unchanged.74 The
HCP expects that development will result in a taking of nine percent
of the woodrats, and twenty-one percent of the cottonmice.75 Studies
on the butterfly are incomplete; the effect on the crocodile is unclear,
although there will be no direct taking of individuals. 8 The HCP
presents no conclusions about the long term effects of the takings on
the survival of any of the species.
7
The ESA repeatedly requires use of the "best scientific and com-
mercial data available. 178 This is the standard the North Key Largo
HCP faces in the section 7(a)(2) consultation. In discussing revised
regulations for the consultation process, the FWS noted that:
Federal agencies and applicants are cautioned that they bear the burden
under section 7(a)(2) to show that they have obtained the best available
scientific and commercial data. This is not the Service's burden or obliga-
tion, but the Service does have the responsibility to alert the Federal agency
and any applicant of areas where additional data would provide a better
information base from which to formulate a biological opinion. 79
The North Key Largo HCP is unlikely to satisfy the section 7 re-
quirements: the biological data and analysis are so poor that they are
unlikely to constitute what one court has called a "first class ef-
fort."' 0 In comparison, the San Bruno HCP relied upon a detailed,
two-year study involving up to fifty field personnel, 81 and the
Coachella Valley HCP published the divergent opinions of nine
respected biologists.8
2
When the FWS is part of the HCP study committee, the planning
73. The accounts of the endangered species take up about four percent of the
plan, with the substantive commentary boiling down to less than one page per species.
The plan fails to delineate which areas could be developed with the least effect, making it
impossible to evaluate the effect of individual projects.
74. See infra note 128. It is difficult not to conclude that the plan is being written
to justify certain developments, not to determine which areas could support development,
if any. Hence the suits of the landowners who were left out of the development permits.
75. North Key Largo HCP, supra note 47, at V-44.
76. Id.
77. Compare the San Bruno HCP which provided an estimate of the increased
chances of extinction. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (c), (h)(2)(B) (1982).
79. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,951-52 (1986) (commentary accompanying rules to be codi-
fied at 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(f)).
80. Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. United States Envtl. Protection
Agency, 684 F.2d 1041, 1052 n.9 (1st Cir. 1982).
81. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 980 (9th Cir.
1985).
82. Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at Appendix 1; compare infra text
accompanying notes 118-22. The Secretary can give advice about the adequacy of the
biological data under the rules governing consultations without encountering the possible
problems of inconsistent functions and estoppel. See generally 51 Fed. Reg. 19,927
(1986) (commentary accompanying rules to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402).
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should not proceed without completed field studies. When the biolog-
ical content of the plan is deficient, the FWS should meet its ac-
knowledged responsibility to alert the applicant that the data are
insufficient.
The Applicant Will Minimize and Mitigate the Impacts of
the Taking
In its discussion of the San Bruno plan, the court in Friends of
Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen88 noted that since the FWS con-
cluded that mitigation 4 not only compensated for the impact, but
enhanced the survival of the species, the lack of an Environmental
Impact Statement was reasonable. The San Bruno HCP involved not
only funding for habitat improvement, but also the dedication of
substantial areas of private land to the public.
With respect to the Coachella Valley, little could be done to im-
prove the areas to be preserved, other than providing protective mea-
sures such as preventing incursions by off-road vehicles. The situa-
tion did not allow for the creation of "new habitat." The minimal
mitigation measures incorporated in the plan indicate that takings
have become not merely "incidental" but "cheap."
In exchange for 10(a) permits to destroy about one-half of the
remaining Fringe-toed Lizards, property owners must pay an aver-
age of 600 dollars per acre when the land is developed. 85 These fees
will total five to seven million dollars, but will account for only one-
third of the funds needed to purchase remaining areas for pre-
serves.8 Beyond the fact that 600 dollars per acre is not overly oner-
83. 760 F.2d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 1985).
84. Mitigation and enhancement measures, as defined by the section 7 exemption
process, include a variety of steps such as live propagation, transplantation, and habitat
acquisition. 50 C.F.R. § 450.01 (1985). These steps are designed to minimize adverse
effects and/or improve the conservation status of the species. Reasonable cost and availa-
bility of the technology are factors to be considered. This definition may provide a rea-
sonable model for section 10(a).
This requirement for approval of a 10(a) permit is particularly difficult to discuss be-
cause the efforts, which must be taken to the maximum extent practicable, inevitably will
be tailored to the individual species involved, thus requiring a detailed consideration of
the biology of the endangered species.
85. Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at V-6 to -10.
86. Fees of $600/acre will be collected until $7 million is acquired, which is ex-
pected to take five to seven years. After that, only $100/acre will be charged. Id. at V-6.
The HCP concluded that it was not necessary to purchase one area of critical habitat,
but noted that "[a]dditional land at WWFP [a preserve] could be considered at a later
time if a source of funds is available." Id. at IX-7. Some of those funds would be availa-
ble if the fee were maintained at $600/acre. The choice of $600/acre and the subsequent
reduction to $100/acre are examples of the mystifying decisions which the HCPs do not
ous (for residential development, only one or two hundred dollars per
dwelling), nothing exists in the legislative history to justify why pub-
lic and charitable entities should shoulder two-thirds of the financing
necessary to purchase the preserves allowing the 10(a) permit.87 Un-
like San Bruno, no land will be dedicated outright to the public.
Drafts of the North Key Largo HCP do not present adequate
figures to provide comparable statistics. However, it appears that
preserves will consist primarily of land already purchased or sched-
uled to be purchased by some branch of the government. The devel-
oper's burden is minimal and consists only of the unlikely decrease in
marketability of projects caused by attaching mitigation fees to the
ultimate consumer's bill. Mitigation fees come from three sources:
$2/night for temporary lodging, $2/week for residential units, and
$2500/dwelling at the close of the initial sale.83 The plan requires
neither dedication of land nor fees requiring a direct sacrifice by the
developer.
Ensuring the Provision of Adequate Funding
Most species are quite vulnerable to fragmentation of habitat.
Small pockets of suitable habitat generally are incapable of support-
ing populations indefinitely. In planning reserves, biologists seek to
provide several large refuges, rather than many small ones totalling
the same acreage.89
explain. See infra text accompanying notes 115-22.
87. The use of public funds to finance the conservation measures necessary to
complete an HCP may be equitable. Landowners who suddenly find that their land is
inhabited by a newly listed endangered species may suffer significant economic losses.
Because conservation of endangered species is in the public interest, the use of public
funds certainly can be justified. However, before public funds are used to finance the
mitigation necessary to justify development, a far more thorough inquiry is needed to
determine how much can reasonably be collected as development fees, and whether the
proposed projects warrant the use of public funds. Prohibitions against development and
the use of public funds are two issues involving the complex matters of police power,
eminent domain, and "takings" in the sense of property law. See Carlton, Property
Rights and Incentives in the Preservation of Species, in THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES
256 (B. Norton ed. 1986).
Government funds were shifted to purchase much of the preserve. Sources include the
Land and Water Conservation Fund ($10 million) and the Bureau of Land Management
($5 million). Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at V-2 to -3. Such funds are severely
limited, and one suspects that Peter has been robbed to pay Paul. The shifting of govern-
ment funds presents a hidden cost which should form part of the calculations of the
HCP.
88. North Key Largo HCP, supra note 47, at VI-65 to -66. The plan also lacks
sufficient detail to determine how the mitigation fees will be spent. Unlike the Coachella
Valley HCP, the ratio of private to public financing is unavailable, and a tentative
budget for the ongoing maintenance of the reserves is lacking. While the HCP provides
for some habitat enhancement, the adequacy of such mitigation is indeterminable when
the financial support is unknown.
89. E.g., Vermeij, The Biology of Human-Caused Extinctions, in THE PRESER-
VATION OF SPECIES 29-35 (B. Norton ed. 1986).
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In the Coachella Valley, once a certain number of parcels has
been developed, the habitat will be sufficiently fragmented so that
the undeveloped, interspersed parcels will be incapable of indefinitely
sustaining natural populations of Fringe-toed Lizards.90 This prob-
lem is particularly significant in the Coachella Valley, where man-
made windbreaks such as railroad tracks, freeways, and rows of trees
block the wind-borne transport of sand necessary to maintain the
dunes.9 '
A potential problem arises if the cooperative agreement of the
HCP falls apart when the take is effectively complete but before
enough development has occurred to finance mitigation. This has
partly occurred with Congress' model plan, San Bruno. It is likely to
occur when potentially dozens of entities become parties to plans
lasting a decade or longer.
On June 3, 1986 the voters of the City of Brisbane, one of the
participants in the San Bruno HCP, approved an initiative to limit
growth.92 With development fees reduced, the financial calculations
upon which mitigation was based were no longer valid. No decision
has been reached on how the shortfall is to be met; potentially the
entire plan could collapse.
The North Key Largo HCP calmly notes that "Port Bougainville/
Garden Cove has been approved for 2806 units, 600 of which are
planned as hotel rooms. The project is currently in receivership, and
the plans may be modified on the basis of the current economic cli-
* mate in the area."98 The potential shortfall in revenue from any
bankruptcy jeopardizes the financial integrity of a section 10(a) per-
mit; the endangered species should not face jeopardy as a result.
The legal system is accustomed to coping with the failure of busi-
ness transactions. However, with HCPs, the silent partner is an en-
dangered species, vulnerable in the absence of complete protection.
It is always difficult to make injured parties whole, but when the
injured party is an endangered species threatened with the catastro-
phe of extinction, the damage is incalculable. Ensuring adequate
90. Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at IX-6 to -7.
91. The Coachella Valley HCP paid close attention to preserving areas for which
long-term sources of sand could be guaranteed. Id. at II-1 to -12.
92. The City of Brisbane currently is involved in litigation with one of the devel-
opers. The FWS is considering intervening, but other parties are opposing that move.
See, e.g., Letter from Alan Beals to Frank Dunkle (May 21, 1986) (request by National
League of Cities that the FWS not intervene in Southwest Diversified v. City of
Brisbane).
93. North Key Largo HCP, supra note 47, at 11-88.
funding is necessary to receive a 10(a) permit, yet one of the three
HCPs is already in disarray, and North Key Largo now faces the
potential of a similar fate. The FWS should require applicants for
10(a) permits to insure or bond their performance of mitigation
measures. Congress wanted creative partnerships in the 10(a) pro-
cess,9" but creative partnerships, just like creative financing, some-
times fail. Creative partnerships require conventional financial
practices.
Components of an HCP
To obtain a permit for an "incidental take," the applicant must
submit a Habitat Conservation Plan outlining the likely impact of
the taking; the HCP requires procedures for minimization and miti-
gation of the impact, funding for those procedures, possible alterna-
tives, and reasons for not using them.95 These statutory requirements
largely have been discussed above in detailing the Secretary's stan-
dards for issuance of a 10(a) permit.96 The following subjects have
proven to be important elements of the first three HCPs.
The Length of the Permit
In commenting on the 10(a) permit process, Congress noted that
permits of "30 or more years duration may be appropriate in order
to provide adequate assurances to the private sector to commit to
long-term funding for conservation activities or long-term commit-
ments to restrictions on the use of land. 97 The conference report
noted that the FWS should assess both the positive and negative ef-
fects of the permit's duration.9 s If a project satisfies the section 10(a)
criteria, granting a long-term permit may be entirely appropriate
when such assurance is needed. However, long-term permits reduce
the control by the FWS over changing events, particularly when
granted in conjunction with blanket permits.
In HCPs to date, the changes in land use have been so drastic that
the duration of the permit is essentially irrelevant. Endangered spe-
cies (as well as much wildlife) are incompatible with housing tracts.
94. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2871.
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (1982).
96. For a discussion of incidental take, see supra text accompanying notes 53-57;
for a discussion of the impact of the taking, see supra text accompanying notes 58-82; for
a discussion of minimization and mitigation, see supra text accompanying notes 83-88;
for a discussion of adequate funding, see supra text accompanying notes 89-94; and for a
discussion of alternatives, see infra text accompanying notes 130-31.
97. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2872.
98. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2860, 2872.
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Once the project is built, the land use is determined for the foresee-
able future.99
The amount of future development fees is another uncertain issue.
The Coachella Valley HCP discusses, but does not resolve, the prob-
lem of inflation.100 The North Key Largo HCP states that the
nightly and weekly fees are to be tied to inflation, but does not spec-
ify how and when adjustments will be made.' 0' If future develop-
ment is to finance conservation measures required by the Act, the
scheduled fees must keep pace with the cost of the measures, espe-
cially the price of land. The usual government indices often do not
reflect changes in local property values, particularly in areas with
increasing amounts of development.10 2 Although a good formula may
be difficult to establish, the best approximation should be required to
ensure that the endangered species does not suffer from economic
fluctuations. 03
Blanket Permits and Project Evaluation
In its discussion of 10(a) permits, Congress repeatedly referred to
private landowners.104 In heartily endorsing the San Bruno plan,
99. A long-term permit may encourage a property owner considering his options a
year before the permit expires to conclude that a full-scale take and payment of the
current development fee make better business sense than waiting and facing the uncer-
tainties of applying for a new permit. The take may have been authorized in the original
permit, but the manner and purposes of the take are hardly consonant with the ESA.
While such decisions might occur with a short-term permit, they seem more likely when
the permit stretches out for decades, and when the permit has been granted in blanket
fashion to a local government.
100. Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at V-12.
101. North Key Largo HCP, supra note 47, at VI-65.
102. Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at V-12. It is no coincidence that the
first three planned HCPs have been on the San Francisco Peninsula, around Palm
Springs, and on the Florida Keys. All three areas have shown dramatic rates of growth.
Growth decreases populations of the local flora and fauna, tends to increase property
values, and thereby increases the pressure to develop remaining natural areas. The pres-
sure is particularly great around San Francisco and on the Florida Keys, where the abil-
ity to expand is so limited by the coastline.
The use of government funds for the purchase of preserves points to the power of local
politics. For instance, 64% of the funding for the Coachella Valley Plan comes from the
government. Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at V-6. Time will tell whether an
HCP in a remote rural area will be able to command the same levels of government
support as the HCPs of resort areas.
103. There is the natural assumption that the rates would have to be adjusted
upward, because this is, almost without exception, the story of land prices in the United
States. If the species has been afforded adequate conservation measures, there is nothing
in principal to prevent downward adjustments if that is the case with local land prices
affecting the developers and the preserves.
104. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Congress obviously also expected local governments to be involved. It
is not clear that Congress expected subsequent HCPs to be domi-
nated by local governments requesting blanket permits for unplan-
ned projects anywhere within their jurisdictions. Given the scale of
these permits, jeopardy is hardly an adequate criterion by which to
evaluate an HCP.
In theory, in the absence of a jeopardy finding, blanket permits
and unknown projects, while seeming unsatisfying in considering the
taking of endangered species, are acceptable because the biological
concerns of the ESA are satisfied. 10 5 However, in practice, some type
of utility or balancing test seems appropriate when the level of take
reaches the order of magnitude evidenced in the first three HCPs.' 8
Such tests are required only in the exemption process, which is never
reached if jeopardy is not found.1°7
This discussion highlights again the importance of the definition of
jeopardy, and the enforcement of it. If the FWS had used a stricter
definition of jeopardy and had made a finding of jeopardy in the
Coachella Valley, and had the exemption process then been required,
the many second homes anticipated in the Coachella Valley would
have been unlikely to satisfy the rigorous "public interest" and "re-
gional and national significance" tests of the exemption process.10 8
Strengths are evident in both sections 7 and 10. Section 7 requires
105. See supra text accompanying notes 58-82. This Comment takes the position
that under any definition, there should have been a jeopardy finding in the Coachella
Valley, and, if jeopardy is correctly to be considered as involving effects on recovery as
well as survival, there should be more jeopardy findings elsewhere.
In comparison with blanket permits, section 7 projects either require another federal
permit, or are the work of another federal agency. Generally, this ensures that the pro-
ject is known, has been subjected to public scrutiny in some fashion, and has received a
stamp of approval. Although this review may have nothing to do with ESA matters, as
the FWS will only examine the project with the jeopardy standard in mind, the section 7
project is subject to more scrutiny than a project covered by a blank check type of HCP.
106. Of course all these projects also have to go through any state and local regu-
latory procedures. For instance, the State of Florida has designated North Key Largo as
an Area of Critical State Concern, and the region is covered by the Monroe County
Comprehensive Plan. However, if the FWS is willing to give approval on the matter of
endangered species, it is highly unlikely that a state agency will block a project on the
basis of state endangered species laws.
107. Such a test seems especially appropriate if jeopardy is to be defined in the
restricted way upon which the FWS insists. Particularly as technology improves, it will
be increasingly possible to "guarantee" survival - that is, not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of survival - with captive breeding, transplants, and the like. See generally
Slobodkin, On the Susceptibility of Different Species to Extinction: Elementary Instruc-
tions for Owners of a World, in THE PRESERVAnON OF SPECiES 239 (B. Norton ed.
1986). This is hardly the purpose of the ESA, however.
108. Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at V-7; see also 16 U.S.C. §1536(h)(1) (1982) (for the exemption process); M. BEAN, supra note 2, at 370-73. The
HCP discusses second homes as a primary purpose of development in the Coachella Val-
ley. It seems intuitively obvious that second homes have less utility than most develop-
ments, and so any taking leading to second homes should be small in size and negligible
in effect.
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review on a project-by-project basis, with the scrutiny such review
entails. 109 The jeopardy standard is harder to employ when projects
are presented in a piecemeal manner. Jeopardy is an imprecise stan-
dard, and the margin of error required by institutionalized caution
remains to be absorbed by developers with political influence. If a
ten percent drop in numbers constitutes jeopardy, and a series of
projects each taking one percent of the original population is
presented, it will be difficult for the FWS to deny the tenth project
or any other. Increments seem so negligible, yet in aggregate are
highly significant. 110
Although blanket permits and unknown projects present problems,
the HCP allows coordinated planning by considering the effects of
development in other than a piecemeal fashion, while providing a
means for funding efficacious conservation measures. The benefits of
such central planning can be great.111
Amendments to HCPs
Congress was aware that over the course of a long-term permit
some conditions would change, and recommended that a plan include
procedures for handling unforeseen circumstances. 1 2 All three
HCPs specify different types of amendments and provide levels of
review based upon the amount of impact on the conservation
measures.
An amendment involving more takings requires public hearings.
The standard for FWS review of the amendments is the jeopardy
109. However, compare the project-by-project review with the review established
in the Coachella Valley HCP: "The appropriateness of the HCP is judged by the [FWS]
as a whole: that is, each program by an individual jurisdiction or entity is summed to-
gether for the overall evaluation." Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at VII-8 (em-
phasis added). Of course, each jurisdiction may have many unknown future projects.
110. See Lovejoy, Species Leave the Ark One by One, in THE PRESERVATION OF
SPECIEs 22 (B. Norton ed. 1986). In making internal judgmefits about jeopardy, the
FWS is aided if it has prepared a recovery plan. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0 (1982) (for the
species).
111. For instance, the Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at IX-2, notes that
given the importance of large blocks of habitat, prompt action is necessary before such
large blocks are no longer in existence. Prompt action will be advantageous if the biology
of the species is well-known, the crucial tracts can be identified, and the large tracts are
threatened with fragmentation. If the biology of the species is poorly known, as is the
case at North Key Largo, see supra text accompanying notes 72-82, an HCP may force
decisions to be made too soon. In comparison with blanket permits, project-by-project
analysis allows for more informed decisions. The proper approach will vary greatly with
the circumstances.
112. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2872.
standard of a 10(a) permit. When jeopardy is interpreted as includ-
ing both recovery and survival, the acreage preserved by an HCP
can be diminished gradually. The San Bruno HCP, upon authoriza-
tion of the local jurisdiction and after notice to all participants, per-
mits minor boundary adjustments (up to thirty feet) totaling up to
five percent of the conserved habitat in a division of the plan. 113 Af-
ter those adjustments, the FWS is likely to allow subsequent en-
croachments because, in addition to the definitional problems of the
jeopardy standard, a plan claiming to enhance survival will have a
cushion leaving room to develop even more acreage without appreci-
ably reducing the likelihood of survival. So far there have been two
amendments reducing the extent of the habitat at San Bruno.114
The ability to amend HCPs for the protection of the species is
essential, and some flexibility is needed for routine adjustments. But
frequent amendments imply that the original HCP was poorly
drafted, or that the FWS is unwilling to maintain the integrity of a
strong plan. Amendments should seldom be needed and should have
strict requirements, such as the unforeseen circumstances which
Congress suggested as a standard.
113. San Bruno HCP, supra note 34, at Agreement 37-38.
114. Of the amendments, the most offensive is a garbage dump. The dump
originated as a trespass, which the controlling jurisdiction failed to prevent. An initial
jeopardy opinion in response to a request to continue dumping was later reversed basedupon the belief that additional payments of money to be used to enhance habitat else-
where will balance the damage. The dump will be allowed to add another five acres to
the 14 already taken. The problem at San Bruno is that there is a finite amount of
habitat, and a limit exists on how much money will help.
Another amendment involves the permanent removal of nine acres and the temporary
disturbance of 35 more. While based in part upon the need for fill and retaining walls toprevent landslides, the developers will get some additional dwellings. FWS Consultation
of August 16, 1985; FWS Consultation of December 20, 1985; FWS Consultation of
March 24, 1986.
The amendment process of the Coachella Valley HCP is unclear. It requires that "the
full extent of habitat loss over the term of the permit within that area will not change."
Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at VIII-9. This seems to protect quantity of
habitat, but protection of quality of habitat is less secure if less desirable parcels can beexchanged for more desirable ones. Otherwise, the amendment standard is jeopardy. Id.
At North Key Largo, the authority to make jeopardy determinations on amendments
is delegated to the Board of County Commissioners. North Key Largo HCP, supra note
47, at VI-67. A biologist employed by the North Key Largo Management Board will
prepare a report for the Board of County Commissioners. The independence of that biol-
ogist is unlikely to match that of the FWS.
The North Key Largo HCP Agreement states that any amendment approved by the
Board must be approved by any participating agency with regulatory jurisdiction, and
that approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. North Key Largo HCP, supra note 47,
at Agreement, § 7(B)(f). The FWS thus would not be entirely removed from the process,but in reviewing the amendment the FWS would face the pressure accompanying any"unreasonable" withholding of approval. If the FWS allows this delegation of the power
of primary review, it will have placed itself in the position of being unable to give endan-
gered species protection independent of local political pressures.
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The Role of the Secretary in the Formation of HCPs
In evaluating a completed HCP, it is difficult to determine the role
of the FWS. The problem is the avoidance of an appearance of im-
propriety. For example, the North Key Largo HCP was started with
98,000 dollars appropriated by Congress, to be matched by
nonfederal funds.11 5 The FWS was "charged with administering the
Congressional funding" and entered into a grant agreement with the
Florida Department of Community Affairs, under which Monroe
County would prepare the HCP in conjunction with the North Key
Largo Habitat Conservation Plan Study Committee. 16 The Study
Committee is part of the creative partnership, and the FWS is listed
as a member.
117
The FWS is then to review a plan subsidized by federal funds and
formed by a committee of which the FWS is a member. The chances
of the FWS rejecting the plan are minimal. If the FWS sits down at
a committee table as one among equals, and most of the equals have
plans contrary to the goal of conservation, the endangered species
advocate has lost some effectiveness.
The public record also should reflect which FWS personnel partic-
ipated in the various stages of the HCP's preparation. In administra-
tive matters, adjudicatory or judicial functions should not be per-
formed by those whose functions include advocating or investigating
the plan. 1 ' The judges of the plan should be separate from its
advocates.
In evaluating an HCP, the means by which the members of the
115. 51 Fed. Reg. 5746 (1986) (notice of withdrawal of proposed rule). This was a
special appropriation, requested from Congress by Florida Senator Lawton Chiles for the
purpose of drafting an HCP.
116. Id.; 50 Fed. Reg. 53,020 (1985) (availability of scoping document).
117. The Study Committee is dedicated to "reconciling the habitat needs of the
endangered species on North Key Largo and the investment and development expecta-
tions of the owners of land in the area." North Key Largo HCP, supra note 47, at I-1.
The HCP further discusses the scoping process of the National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982) as being a model for the HCP. North Key Largo HCP,
supra note 47, at 1-81. The discussion of reconciliation and the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) mistakes the fundamental nature of the ESA, and points to the
procedural quagmire of the HCPs.
The ESA is primarily a substantive act, while NEPA is essentially procedural. Hill,
437 U.S. at 188 n.34. In the formation of the HCP, the primary criterion must be biol-
ogy, because that is the only way to evaluate the effect of any action on a species. Devel-
opment may not be compatible with the species, or it may be eminently feasible, but it
first must be judged scientifically. See Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp.
561, 573 (D. Mass. 1983). The HCPs practice reconciliation of interests (horse trading),
and then hope the biological information can be used to avoid a jeopardy assessment.
118. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 254-58 (1972).
L&steering committee" (Coachella Valley) or "study committee"
(North Key Largo) make the many difficult decisions remains a
mystery. The Coachella Valley HCP discusses various conservation
options and disposes of them with phrases such as "considered and
rejected" and "judged to be unnecessary."11 These decisions deter-
mine the fate of the Fringe-toed Lizard, yet the HCP is silent as to
how they were made.
The FWS has failed to publish regulations detailing the nature of
its involvement in the process. Such regulations are necessary to
avoid an appearance of impropriety and to prevent developers from
asserting equitable estoppel in the event of a subsequent jeopardy
finding by the FWS. Although a large body of law states that equi-
table estoppel does not apply to the government, courts increasingly
are applying estoppel in appropriate circumstances. 120 Depending
upon the representations made by the FWS in the preparation of an
HCP, the FWS could be estopped from subsequently making a jeop-
ardy finding.
Section 7 provides for a consultation by which other agencies and
applicants for federal permits determine what their responsibilities
will be under the ESA. This process provides for a combination of
review by and cooperation with the FWS.21 The 1982 amendments
included the means by which applicants could obtain "early consul-
tation" in order to attempt to resolve potential conflicts early in the
planning stages.122
Consultation under section 7 maintains the necessary distance be-
tween the FWS and applicants. That distance should be incorpo-
rated in the 10(a) process. Within creative partnerships there should
be aloof senior partners; among equals, there may be a first among
equals. While Congress has expressed concern about reducing con-
flicts and allowing for flexibility, when conflict arises the FWS
should be in a position to best fulfill its statutory mandate to protect
endangered species.
Critical Habitat
Critical habitat consists of specific areas where the physical or bio-
logical features essential to the conservation of the species are
119. Coachella Valley HCP, supra note 42, at IX-7. As previously mentioned, the
committee decided to collect only $100/acre after the initial $5-7 million was collected.
See supra note 86. In the absence of an adjustment for inflation, what will $100 buy in
29 years? Was there no land which could be purchased by continuing to collect $600/
acre for the remainder of the project? The HCP is silent about how such decisions were
made.
120. See K. DAVIS. supra note 118, at 343.
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (c) (1982).
122. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,927 (1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.11).
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found.1 23 On February 18, 1986 the FWS withdrew its critical
habitat proposal for the endangered Key Largo Woodrat and Key
Largo Cottonmouse, reasoning that "[p]ublic land acquisition and
preliminary land planning efforts involved in an ongoing Habitat
Conservation Plan . . . indicate that it is not prudent to designate
critical habitat ....
The FWS noted in the same document, "[i]ssuance of [a 10(a)
permit] is subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the
[ESA]. ''"25 Section 7(a)(2) specifies, in addition to the jeopardy
standard, that a federal agency shall ensure that any agency action
is not likely to result in the destruction or adverse modification of
critical habitat. As the FWS has noted elsewhere, 10(a) permits
would not be approved if they resulted in the destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat. 26 If critical habitat is designated,
the HCP authors will have their freedom of choice considerably re-
duced. It is natural to suspect that the distaste for critical habitat
may be based on this consideration.
1 2 7
Nothing exists in the legislative history or the regulatory defini-
tions of "prudent" to suggest that the preparation of an HCP ren-
123. Critical habitat requires special management considerations or protection. See
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (1982). The Secretary shall designate critical habitat "to the maxi-
mum extent prudent and determinable." Id. § 1533(a)(3). The designation of critical
habitat in the proper circumstances became mandatory in the 1978 amendments. See
Enos v. Marsh, 616 F. Supp. 32, 60 (D. Hawaii), affd, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1984).
This evidences Congressional belief that "individual species should not be viewed in isola-
tion, but must be viewed in terms of their relationship to the ecosystem of which they
form a constitutent element." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 30, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2860, 2871.
Biological, not economic, considerations are relevant in determining whether a species
should be listed. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 12, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2807, 2812. However, in determining if critical habitat should
be listed, and after considering all the biological factors, the Secretary shall "consider
the probable economic and other impacts of the designation upon proposed or ongoing
activities" and exclude any portion "if the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the bene-
fits of specifying the area as part of the critical habitat." 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (1985).
124. 51 Fed. Reg. 5746 (1986) (notice of withdrawal of proposed rule).
125. Id.
126. 50 Fed. Reg. 39,684 (1985) (commentary accompanying final rules to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 13, 17).
127. Congress did not include the adverse modification of critical habitat as a stan-
dard for section 10(a), so the only route is through section 7(a)(2). While critical habitat
does not automatically protect an area absent some federal agency action, see M. BEAN,
supra note 2, at 334, if an area warrants designation as critical habitat, destruction or
adverse modification of the habitat most likely would be considered a take prohibited
under section 9. See Field, supra note 15; Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural
Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), a~fd, 639 F.2d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 1981);
M. BEAN, supra note 2, at 359.
ders specifying critical habitat "imprudent."' 28 Rather, because one
of the purposes of the ESA is to "provide a means whereby the eco-
systems upon which endangered species and threatened species de-
pend may be conserved,"' 2 the presence of any critical habitat
should be a vital planning tool in the preparation of a Habitat Con-
servation Plan.
The "No Action" Alternative
In considering alternatives, HCPs too quickly dismiss the "no ac-
tion" alternative as leading to a steady worsening of the status of the
endangered species. Implicit in the rejection of the "no action" alter-
native is the assumption that the FWS will not enforce the prohibi-
tions against taking. If "take" is interpreted as broadly as the stat-
utes and regulations have been written, 30 the combination of "no
128. Congress has expressed its approval of the interpretation of "prudent" asmeaning to conceal the location of the endangered species in order to prevent deliberate,illegal takes, as by unscrupulous collectors. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 20, re-printed in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2807, 2820. The FWS provides ageneral explanation of when the designation would not be prudent: the designation would
not be beneficial to the species. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (1985).
Implicit in the decision of the FWS is the assumption that the HCP process will work.The HCP committee somehow has decided which landowners will be allowed to developtheir land, and which either will be unable to develop, or must sell to the government forpreserves. San Bruno dealt with one large parcel, while the Coachella Valley preserved solittle land that no disputes developed among the landowners. In the absence of clearbiological reasons for allocating building permits, the stability of HCPs is questionable:no procedures have been devised to handle disputes among the landowners. North KeyLargo presents such a situation, and the strains are evidenced in a suit in state court,claiming in part that the HCP committee lacks the authority to do what is, in essence,zoning. See Friends of the Everglades v. Florida Dep't of Community Affairs, No. 85-2509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. filed 1985). In comparison with the project-by-project ap-proach of section 7 consultations, HCPs have started rearranging local land use designa-tions. To the extent that local zoning is effected, an HCP will need approval of the local
government.
For the FWS the primary responsibility is ensuring the biological integrity of theHCP. But the potential for disputes should alert the FWS to the fragility of a plan, afactor to consider both in awarding long-term permits and ensuring adequate funding, as
well as in considering critical habitat.
129. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1982).
130. See supra note 14. However,
[s]ince all takings are prohibited and potentially punishable by significant civiland criminal penalties, the Act's potential for influencing activities that result
in incidental taking depended, at least in part, on the public's perception of the
government's willingness to prosecute such activites. Not surprisingly, suchprosecutions were very rare, and the Act's theoretically absolute prohibition
against any form of taking bore little resemblance to the reality of
nonenforcement.
M. BEAN, supra note 2, at 353.
The same author hoped that "the opportunity to secure [10(a)] permits should removethe reluctance of enforcement officials to seek sanctions against those who choose to goforward with activities causing incidental takings without ever applying for such per-mits." Id. at 354. And as it currently is administered, the HCP process should not dis-
courage applicants.
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action" and enforcement of section 9 could greatly reduce environ-
mental degradation.
The problem with such a strategy is that in some cases substantial
enforcement against private landowners is politically unaccept-
able, 31 requires much manpower, and may fail to accomplish the
goal of saving individuals of the endangered species. While the gov-
ernment is able to prohibit takings, it cannot force the affirmative
action necessary for true conservation, nor can it police the more
subtle forms of permissive and involuntary habitat degradation. For
instance, in the Coachella Valley, off-road vehicles are a problem.
An absentee landowner cannot be expected to take steps necessary to
exclude unauthorized users of his land, and it is easy for landowners
to feign ignorance of activities which will eliminate what they regard
as their lizard problem.
One alternative is noticeably missing from HCPs: additional af-
firmative conservation measures by the government. Congress, which
spreads lavish praise on the ESA, spends frugally.
323 Funding from
other federal agencies and from state government is sometimes avail-
able, but is far from adequate. To the FWS personnel accustomed to
small budgets and institutional "no action" policies, the development
fees generated by the HCPs must look quite attractive.
CONCLUSION
The Endangered Species Act of 1973, and the accompanying
amendments, is a strong law. The Hill decision evidences this
strength. The validity of the Act's basic premises are more apparent
today than when enacted thirteen years ago. The flora and fauna are
of incalculable value, require institutionalized caution, and are
threatened daily. However, some actions taken in recently drafted
HCPs show that the Act can be weakened. The ESA must be re-
paired and improved.
The current administration is not overly sympathetic to wildlife.
Politics have entered into FWS business in every administration, and
will continue to do so. The bipartisan appeal of the ESA can be seen
in the self-serving statements appearing in the Congressional Record
at the time of each reenactment, 33 while the sincerity of support is
131. See Coggins & Russell, supra note 23, at 1459.
132. See infra note 133.
133. E.g., H.R. 1027, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H6464-70 (commen-
tary accompanying passage); S. 725, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REc. S3337-39
(commentary accompanying introduction).
evidenced by scant funding.134 Unfortunately, the political fallout
engendered by an endangered species which prevents construction of
a local project is considerable.
Political solutions exist for improving the ESA. The executive
branch can provide the staffing and direction for federal agencies.
Congress can pass strengthened laws and provide greater funding,
especially if the executive branch is enthusiastic. At present, the
strongest and most consistent support for endangered species has
come from the courts, which fortunately have taken the ESA and
the Congress at their word.
No difference should exist between sections 7 and 10. Congress
created section 10(a) to provide private landowners not requiring
any other federal permit a method to gain access to the regulatory
machinery of the ESA. Although the requirement of another federal
permit provides some additional screening of projects, consistency
suggests that no major difference should exist between private land-
owners needing a federal permit and those not needing a permit. The
biology of the endangered species is the same, regardless of who
owns the land.
Based upon the first three HCPs, a landowner with access to sec-
tion 10(a) is in a better position than a landowner required to start
with section 7. Rather than eliminating inequality, section 10(a) has
reestablished it. To promote consistency and uniformity, the section
7 process should be available to all, either through outright merger
of the sections, or through administrative or congressional clarifica-
tion that absolutely no substantive differences exist.
The underlying problem, involving sections 7 and 10(a), is the in-
terpretation of jeopardy. A take of more than seventy-five percent of
the habitat, or of twenty percent of the individuals, is not jeopardy
according to the HCPs. HCPs thereby become blank checks for the
destruction of endangered and threatened species. If jeopardy is de-
fined with survival and recovery in mind, and is enforced in that
manner, then HCPs will face a fair and rigorous process. If there is
a jeopardy determination, alternatives can be found, or the HCP can
go through the exemption process, the accompanying scrutiny, and
be examined on the merits.
The section 10(a) process could effectuate the goals of the ESA.
The issue of jeopardy determines the quality of the end product, but
is separate from the process itself. As concluded above, all property
owners should be involved in a single process consisting of the sub-
stance of section 7 and the accessibility of section 10(a). The HCP
of the 10(a) process offers the tremendous strength of centralized
134. Id. The precise amount awaits final Congressional action, but will be less than
$50 million.
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planning. HCPs also offer the potential benefits of prompt action and
the necessary finances. With proper restrictions on FWS involvement
in its preparation, closer scrutiny of blanket permits, tighter allow-
ance of amendments, more realistic forms of mitigation, insistence
on first class biological research, and reliance on properly designated
critical habitat, a "publicly" prepared recovery plan is an attractive
concept able to further the goals of the ESA. However, the number
of problems attendant to the HCP process suggests that HCPs plan-
ning the future existence of a species must be examined with the
strictest scrutiny. Congress should amend the ESA to ensure that its
procedures fulfill the substantive goal of conservation.
RICHARD E. WEBSTER

